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A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
by Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss. Oxford University
Press, 2012. 203 pp. Hardback $85.00.
Reviewed by Molly Land, University of Connecticut School of Law.
molly.land@law.uconn.edu. 1
Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s recent book, A NEOFEDERALIST
VISION OF TRIPS, is an important and exciting new addition to debates
about international intellectual property governance. In this book, the
authors take on one of the field’s most central questions: is the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in fact an
intellectual property “code”? The authors argue that TRIPS is commonly
misconstrued, both by rights holders and academics, as a supranational code
that tells members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) “what they
must do and when and how they must do it” (p.5). Although many have
argued that TRIPS imposes only minimum standards, Dinwoodie and
Dreyfuss provide in this book the most thorough and decisive refutation of
the “code” view of TRIPS to date. The authors contend that TRIPS is not a
code but a “neofederalist” regime that imposes basic substantive
expectations in order to promote coordination but which nonetheless
preserves considerable member state autonomy.
A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS addresses both the
fragmentation of norms and the fragmentation of authority in international
intellectual property law, 2 with a particular emphasis on the latter. In
particular, the book draws attention to the TRIPS regime’s allocation of
authority between states and international institutions. 3 Dinwoodie and
Dreyfuss consider this “vertical” allocation of authority between states and
international institutions under the TRIPS agreement in historical, textual,
and structural terms.
They argue that the TRIPS regime is
“neofederalist”—not in a constitutional sense, 4 but rather in terms of the
considerable discretion it reserves to states to implement intellectual
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property policies in ways responsive to local needs. Calling for increased
use of techniques such as proportionality analysis (p.107), the book makes a
compelling case for state autonomy in regulating innovation policy through
the framework of the TRIPS agreement.
The book proceeds in three sections, looking at the past, present, and future
of global intellectual property lawmaking. The first section, entitled
“Where We Were”, considers the history of this regulation and the genesis
of the TRIPS agreement. The authors support their case for a neofederalist
understanding of TRIPS by pointing to the central demands that have
shaped global intellectual property lawmaking over time—the need for
balance, diversity among countries in terms of priorities and innovation
strategies, and changes in the creative ecosystem. These demands are best
accommodated within a structure that “gives states autonomy to address the
complexity, diversity, and historical contingency of intellectual property
law” but at the same time “requires them to act within the overlay of a
coordinated international intellectual property regime” (p.14). Dinwoodie
and Dreyfuss then turn to the negotiating history of TRIPS, arguing that
although some of the states involved in the negotiations sought to make
TRIPS into a global “code”, the resulting document was the product of real
compromise and protects considerable state discretion and autonomy in
implementing TRIPS’s minimum standards.
The second part of the book, entitled “Where We Are”, examines how
TRIPS operates in practice. The authors first consider a series of national
innovations in intellectual property lawmaking in light of the existing
jurisprudence of the dispute settlement bodies of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). They conclude that the impact of dispute resolution
has been mixed, with some decisions respecting national autonomy and
others adopting a more restrictive approach. The authors then turn to the
structural features of the TRIPS agreement, including the principles of
national treatment, most favored nation, and non-discrimination. They
argue that national treatment, in particular, would provide more appropriate
guidance for panels addressing the validity of new innovations such as
sharing workloads among national patent offices and the EU Database
Directive. The final chapter in this section argues that in evaluating local
policy innovations, dispute settlement panels should consider tradeoffs in
legislation overall rather than looking at particular policies in isolation;
afford more room to states seeking to respond to changes in the innovation
ecology; and consider the special problems of capacity faced by developing
countries.
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The final section, “Where We Are Going”, presents the authors’ vision for
the future. The first chapter in this section considers the fragmentation of
intellectual property lawmaking. Arguing that fragmentation must be
managed in order to ensure the coherence needed for a robust innovation,
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss suggest several techniques for integrating nonWTO law into TRIPS lawmaking in order to “gain the benefits of
regulatory competition while minimizing its costs” (p.147). In considering
whether to use non-trade law, the authors contend that panels and the
Appellate Body should consider the source of the norm, its timing,
governance issues (e.g., “hard” versus “soft” law), and the degree of overlap
in coverage between the norm and the subject matter of TRIPS. The final
chapter then introduces the idea of a global intellectual property “acquis”—
a set of “background norms” that might guide intellectual property policymaking on the international level (p.176)—and begins to identify in national
and international sources, judicial lawmaking, and scholarship some of the
normative commitments that might form the basis of such an acquis.
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss argue that identifying shared normative
commitments would aid the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies and remedy
some of the overly restrictive interpretations identified earlier in the book.
An international intellectual property acquis could also help foster
normative integration across regimes and guide future international
lawmaking in this area. Among these intellectual property “meta-norms”
(p.180), the authors include principles about access to knowledge goods
(what they call “access-regarding principles”), norms designed to adapt to
the challenges of new technologies, and national treatment for both users
and producers.
This book makes several important contributions to international
intellectual property scholarship. First, Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss decisively
refute the “code” vision of the TRIPS agreement. Despite what might seem
to be widespread agreement in some circles that TRIPS imposes only
minimum standards, the belief that the treaty is instead a comprehensive
supranational code of intellectual property rules continues to have
considerable vitality. Efforts to use a European Union Regulation to seize
shipments of medicines while in transit, for example, even when the
shipments would not violate the intellectual property law of either the
sending or receiving country, are tied to a perception of TRIPS as imposing
global norms and limiting individual state discretion to vary intellectual
property rules in ways that allow generic production. 5 More recently, this
“code” vision is reflected in Eli Lilly’s initiation of arbitration proceedings
under the North American Free Trade Agreement challenging the
invalidation of one of its patents by Canadian courts, despite the
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considerable discretion that TRIPS leaves to member states to decide what
inventions meet the standards it imposes. 6 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s
refutation of the “code” vision of TRIPS is particularly important in light of
these new intellectual property claims being asserted through enforcement
measures and in the investment treaty context.
Second, the book provides an extraordinarily useful playbook for defending
local innovations in intellectual property policy making. Dinwoodie and
Dreyfuss provide a comprehensive and pragmatic assessment of how the
WTO dispute settlement bodies might respond were they asked to assess the
validity of three recent examples of local policy innovations—raising the
inventive step, new statutory defenses to patent infringement, and varying
the relief for infringement. Their analysis of these innovations is especially
valuable given how few cases address the scope of TRIPS flexibilities and,
in particular, the lack of cases litigated by parties with an incentive to
defend state autonomy. For TRIPS litigants, scholars, and governmental
officials, especially from the developing world, the book provides a very
useful and instructive assessment of the arguments that might be marshaled
for and against these recent policy initiatives.
Third, the book calls attention to the difficulty tribunals face interpreting
ambiguous treaties. Treaties are notoriously indeterminate: capable of
multiple interpretations and inconsistent both internally and externally. 7
There is no requirement of a “meeting of the minds” in treaty drafting, and
indeed, many of the ambiguities in treaties might be understood as precisely
the opposite—as agreements to disagree. 8 Ambiguities in treaties, and
particularly the use of standards instead of rules, also reflect the fact that
anticipating all possible contingencies might have been prohibitively costly
or even impossible. 9 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s argument can be
understood in part as a critique of the interpretive methodology chosen by
the dispute settlement bodies in the face of such ambiguity in TRIPS
cases. 10 For intellectual property cases, the dispute settlement bodies have
chosen a strictly textual interpretive methodology, which has resulted in
awkward and strained reasoning that—as the book persuasively argues—is
both inconsistent with the text of the agreement and fails to fulfill its goals.
A methodology that considers context as well as the object and purpose of
the treaty would better achieve the goals of the global intellectual property
system that the book articulates at the outset.
The book also points, however, to what is I think an even more fundamental
problem with interpretation by adjudicators in TRIPS cases: the challenge
of resolving ambiguities in a text that is designed to achieve a complex
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variety of goals, many of which are in considerable tension with one
another. 11 In choosing one interpretation over another—for example, in
deciding whether databases are covered by the TRIPS agreement—the
“object and purpose” of the TRIPS agreement could point in several
different directions at once, as the authors discuss (pp.95-97). In such
situations, the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies will inevitably be required
to choose between competing visions of “the good.” Even when a broader
reading would seem consistent with the purpose of the TRIPS agreement—
such as a broader definition of “diagnostic” (p.67) or a more flexible
interpretation of the term “limited” (p.62)—panels and the Appellate Body
will still be required to determine where precisely to draw the line between
monopoly and access. The TRIPS agreement, however, often provides little
by way of guidance for navigating hard cases such as these (indeed, as the
authors note, where the agreement does provide guidance, such as with the
mention of “fair use” in Article 17, the panel interpreting this provision in
the EU-GI case was able to better respect the balance that intellectual
property law seeks to achieve (p.69)). The result of the lack of overall
guidance has been a retreat into textual methodologies, an approach that is
particularly inappropriate in “public law” cases, which require evaluation of
the state’s authority to regulate in the public interest. 12 Such cases may
require more “purposive” methodologies that allow the decision maker, in
construing ambiguities in the treaty, to consider the object of the challenged
state regulation and the interests of non-parties affected by that regulation.
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s proposal for an acquis is an important step
toward developing a common body of values from which adjudicators can
draw in reaching interpretive decisions. Of course, at least in the near term,
the development of an acquis will not necessarily help panels resolve the
difficult cases. Because the acquis, as proposed by the authors, is restricted
to values shared by all WTO members—as must be the case, or risk
imposing obligations without consent—it will likely be limited to principles
too general to be of much use in hard cases. For example, intellectual
property exporting and importing states might agree that access is an
important value, but disagree strongly on the precise balance to be struck
between monopoly and access in particular cases. That said, an acquis
might serve—at least for the moment—the more modest goal of reorienting
the dispute resolution bodies and WTO members alike on the values
underlying the system and on the interests of non-parties affected by their
decisions. Recognizing an acquis will not help panels decide where
precisely to draw lines, but it may encourage them to view access and other
public interest values as important countervailing concerns that they can
and should consider.
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I do think, however, that the authors might have more fully embraced the
interpretive role of the WTO dispute settlement bodies. In several places,
the authors disavow that the dispute settlement bodies should be engaging
in “gap filling” (pp.41, 196), express concern over panels making value
judgments (p.101), and condemn the idea of “judicial activism (p.196).
Although Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes prohibits the dispute settlement
bodies from adding to or varying the rights of the parties, it also charges
them with clarifying the existing provisions. 13 Interpretive authority
necessarily involves some measure of law creation, and delegation
accompanied by imprecision—such as we see throughout the TRIPS
agreement—constitutes a transfer of substantial interpretive authority. 14
Such delegation is not, however, incompatible with state autonomy in
setting intellectual property policy. For all the reasons that the authors set
forth in the book, the authority delegated to the dispute settlement panels
should in many instances be re-delegated or re-allocated to the member
states. 15 Their proposals for more deferential standards of review and the
use of a margin of appreciation (e.g., pp.56, 90, 102, 107-108) are two
possible techniques for achieving this goal. 16 Moreover, the interpretive
moves recommended by the authors for protecting local intellectual
property innovations might in fact require the panels to exercise a certain
measure of interpretive authority. A departure from strict textualism—even
if only to re-delegate authority to the state—inherently requires some gap
filling.
I would also have been interested in even more discussion of the political
context in which the dispute settlement bodies operate. It may be that what
is constraining the dispute settlement bodies and causing them to be so
conservative in their decisions is a function of the political space in which
they operate. 17 Perhaps the discourse around TRIPS has been so contested
and impassioned that it has led panels to be particularly concerned about
their expertise and legitimacy. If this is true, legal arguments alone will not
be enough to persuade dispute settlement bodies to be less conservative in
their interpretive methodology. Attention to the political context may make
it possible to foster a more supportive political environment for
neofederalist decision making. For example, in their work comparing the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) with the Andean Tribunal of Justice,
Professors Helfer and Alter have argued that the ECJ’s more expansionist
lawmaking can be attributed to the support of external actors, such as legal
advocacy networks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national
courts, and even government officials. 18 In the TRIPS context, greater
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engagement by NGO networks and other constituencies around particular
disputes could help support more flexible interpretations of the treaty by
panels and the Appellate Body. 19
With this book, Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss have moved the discussion about
global intellectual property regulation forward in significant and important
ways, providing detailed analysis of new local innovations, focusing
attention on the structural features of the TRIPS agreement, and generating
new proposals for resolving conflicts of authority and norms both internal
and external to the TRIPS regime. It would be a highly valuable read for
anyone who works in the field of international intellectual property.
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13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE, by Stuart P. Green. Harvard University Press,
2012. 400 pp. Hardback $45.00.
Reviewed by Irina D. Manta, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra
University.
irina.manta@hofstra.edu.
Stuart Green’s book 13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE impresses with its
breadth and insightful detail as the author performs a tour de force in his
comprehensive treatment of the historically rich and in parts still
controversial law of theft. Green argues that the scholarly framework
regarding theft has remained fairly undeveloped to this day, and he seeks to
begin to fill this gap by delving into the history of theft law, the essential
components of theft, the principles behind and unresolved tensions in the
criminalization of theft, and the question of what constitutes property in the
context of potential theft. Concluding, most importantly, that theft law
today has eliminated moral distinctions and apportions similar punishments
for vastly different offenses in a manner severely disconnected from
community sentiments, Green calls for significant reforms of theft law. As
part of his discussion, Green also tackles difficult issues relating to the
application of theft law to intangible property, such as intellectual property,
virtual property, and information. The result is a fascinating introduction
into every major area of theft law, although, as Green himself acknowledges
throughout, many questions remain for further exploration.
What makes Green’s book particularly interesting for those who study
intellectual property is that it combines the often-asked question of whether
intellectual property is truly property with an analysis of how the answer to
that question in turn shapes criminal law. The applications of this
examination are varied and of both legal and ethical significance,
determining matters such as whether or for how long individuals should be
imprisoned who never improperly acquired tangible property, but rather
only goods covered by copyright, trademark, patent, or trade secret law.
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Chapter 1, entitled “Theft Law Adrift”, examines the history of theft law,
and in particular the movement in the twenty-first century across
Anglophone countries to overhaul arbitrary and inconsistent systems of
theft law. The American Model Penal Code (MPC), the English Theft Act
1968, and similar legislation sought to eliminate some of the archaic
distinctions that the common law drew between various related offenses as
well as some of the unhelpful categorizations of different types of property.
The main goals were ones of consolidation and streamlining, but Green
argues that—in addition to cleaning up arcana—the reforms also swept
aside useful moral distinctions regarding the means of committing theft and
the types of property stolen. Green explains that the corresponding flaws in
legislation neither have been nor can be corrected at the sentencing level,
whether through sentencing guidelines or individual judicial decisionmaking (pp.30-33). One of the key problems with the consolidated
schemes, Green states, is that they violate the principle of fair labeling
(pp.52-54), which dictates that the law must reflect and signal the
community’s perceptions of differences in the kinds and respective gravity
of offenses; hence, crimes should be categorized and labeled such as to
embody the type and extent of legal violations.
In pursuit of achieving fair labeling in theft law, Green conducted extensive
empirical work that he describes in the book (pp.57-68) in which he sought
to test the community’s perceptions of various theft-related legal wrongs
and uncover whether the law reflects these sentiments. Some of the study
stimuli to which he exposed his experiment participants included scenarios
involving the theft of a bicycle and scenarios describing the theft of a test
preparation tool. He varied aspects of the scenarios such as the means by
which the relevant theft was committed or its likely financial impact. Green
asked participants to grade and rank the blameworthiness of the offender
between different variations of the bicycle theft and of the test preparation
tool theft, and the participants also had to assign a sentence to the offenders
in the bicycle theft scenarios. The study results provided evidence for a
chasm between people’s intuitions and the existing consolidated law of
theft, with participants giving more weight to the type of theft and kind of
property involved than theft law considers.
In Chapter 2, named “The Gist of Theft”, Green attempts to “develop a
theory of theft law practically from scratch” (p.69). He begins by
examining the role of blameworthiness in the criminal law, or to what
extent particular types of conduct can be said to entail moral fault. Building
on his previous work in this area, 1 Green studies three elements to
determine blameworthiness (p.72). The first element is harmfulness to
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others. The second is the mens rea, or mental state required for an offense,
usually consisting of intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. The
third element is moral wrongfulness in the sense of the breach of a norm,
rule, right, or duty.
Green first turns his attention to the harm in theft, which generally consists
of substantial interference with property that is both commodifiable and
rivalrous (p.74). He argues that theft law should reflect the value of the
property stolen, though he does not believe that the law can take into
account the subjective value of property to the victim (pp.76-77). Green
also shows the difficulties inherent in defining the mens rea for theft, such
as how to best define the necessary “intent to deprive” (pp.84-87). How
permanent does the deprivation need to be? What if a perpetrator takes an
object with the intent to return it and changes his mind later?
Unsurprisingly, there turns out to be variation between jurisdictions on
some of these matters that cannot escape some degree of arbitrariness.
Green goes on to discuss the wrongs of theft, which he separates between
primary and secondary wrongs. Primary wrongs are those occasioned by
the violation of a property right itself (p.93). Green explains that “the norm
against stealing does have a prelegal, natural existence, but that the norm is
so thoroughly mediated and shaped by the law of property and by other
cultural and social forces that we cannot make much practical sense of it
without reference to such influences” (pp.95-96). Green cites four types of
evidence for the prelegal aspect of the prohibition against stealing. The first
is that society views stealing as wrong as a purely moral matter because it
“is regarded as both sinful and deeply threatening to society” (p.96).
Second, some forms of theft are illegal but not immoral while others are
viewed as immoral but not illegal (p.96). Third, even young children have a
sense of ownership and an awareness that taking another’s belongings is
wrong (p.97). Fourth, anthropological studies have shown that groups and
tribes with only the most rudimentary system of laws enforce prohibitions
against stealing (p.98). When it comes to the post-legal nature of theft,
Green shows how property, contract, and agency law actually fill in the
content of the basic prohibition against stealing (p.99). His study of the
primary wrongs of theft in practice take him through the concepts of lack of
consent, unlawfulness, fraudulence, and dishonesty (pp.104-114).
As far as the secondary wrongs of theft are concerned, Green defines those
as the wrongful means that accompany the deprivation of property (p.115).
He showed in his empirical study that these means are very relevant to the
extent of individuals’ judgments of the gravity of different kinds of thefts,
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and he walks readers through the issues of violence, coercion,
housebreaking, stealth, breach of trust, exploitation of the circumstances of
an emergency, and deception (pp.117-131). For offenses involving each of
these types of wrongs, Green uncovers the tensions that underlie close cases
and provides guidance as to how he would resolve them.
Chapter 3, “Theft as a Crime”, deals with the ability and need of the
criminal law to respond to theft. After giving an overview of the civil law
and non-legal tools to address theft, Green presents his view of how and
when theft should be treated as a crime. He explains that criminalization is
generally justified because “[t]hose who steal challenge the authority of
property rules; they express contempt for the property owner and for society
more generally; they trample over others’ rights in pursuit of their own
selfish interests” (p.141). Green explains how the state has traditionally
been viewed as justified to intervene in theft because individual civil
plaintiffs will not always be willing and able to seek remedies, the state can
best prevent violent retaliation, and theft run amok can undermine the sense
of trust between citizens (pp.144-146). Not entirely satisfied with these
explanations, Green proposes a two-step inquiry as to whether a form of
theft should be criminalized. In the first step, lawmakers would have to ask
themselves if “the crime type typically or normally involved (1) the kind of
conduct that is properly declared wrong by the community as a whole, (2) a
non-negotiable wrong of the sort that one should expect to be categorically
safe from, and (3) something more than a mere conflict that can be
negotiated and resolved” (pp.147-148). The second step of the inquiry
would have prosecutors apply the same analysis when faced with an alleged
criminal (p.148).
In his discussion of the state’s interest in preventing theft, Green mentions
the direct financial costs of theft, estimated at about $15 billion per year in
the United States, but also the indirect costs that come in the form of
reduced property values, lowered life satisfaction, raised anxiety, and
damaged neighborhoods (p.149). Green supports a classical economic
approach to establish an optimal system of criminal sanctions (p.151). He
acknowledges that it is difficult to prove the deterrent effect of theft law
with any precision and that in some cases of theft, the costs of
criminalization may exceed the benefits (pp.152-55). Green concludes
Chapter 3 with an extensive discussion of borderline cases of theft such as
de minimis thefts, theft by failing to return lost or misdelivered property,
receiving stolen property, theft by false promise, writing bad checks, and
extortion that involves a threat to do an unwanted but otherwise legal act.
In the end, he criticizes the MPC and to some extent the English Theft Act

The IP Law Book Review

14

1968 for subjecting these forms of conduct to the same level of punishment
and allowing proof of one to be sufficient to constitute proof of any other
(pp.157-202).
Chapter 4, “Property in Theft Law”, attempts to understand why in Green’s
empirical work participants made clearly different moral judgments
depending on the type of stolen property involved. His study showed that
people viewed the stealing of a physical book as more wrongful than the
unlawful downloading of an electronic book or than sneaking into a lecture
without paying the entrance fee (whether the lecture was sold out or not)
(p.204). Green’s goal is to understand the rationale of study participants in
this respect and to determine what deserves the label of “theft”, which
ultimately determines “how an offense is formulated, classified, and
codified; how such lawbreaking is viewed by the general public; the level at
which punishment will be assigned; and how prosecutorial policy will be
carried out” (p.207). Green states that any property subject to theft must be
commodifiable, rivalrous, and excludable, and that every theft must create a
genuine zero-sum transaction (pp.208-211).
Next, he analyzes the
applicability of the theft label to variations of property within these
categories, like things illegal to buy, sell, or possess (such as contraband
and stolen goods); things legal to possess but not to buy or sell (such as
body parts); and things incapable of being bought or sold (such as credit in
the case of plagiarism and honor in that of the Stolen Valor Act) (pp.211225).
The book then moves on to the topic of the unlawful taking of semitangibles such as electricity, cable, and Wi-Fi services, as well as other
private and public services. After examining to what extent theft of the first
three types of services occasions losses to the seller or third parties, Green
concludes that the strongest case of theft is for electricity, followed by cable
and then by Wi-Fi (pp.225-230). Green also believes that unlawful
behavior in the case of other types of services is best pursued via breach of
contract claims rather than criminalization and the use of the theft label
(pp.230-234).
Most of the rest of the book focuses on the theft of intangible property.
After showing that some forms of such property can be commodifiable but
not always also rivalrous in the way that theft law requires (p.238), Green
explains how identity theft is a misnomer because “personal identities are
nontransferable and therefore noncommodifiable” (p.245). He then tackles
the main forms of intellectual property as they relate to theft. As Green
mentions, both intellectual property (especially copyright) owners and the
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Department of Justice routinely refer to some forms of infringement as theft
(p.246). As far as social norms are concerned, far more individuals engage
in illegal downloads of copyrighted materials than in theft of tangible
property (p.249).
Green questions whether copyright can be subject to theft law by testing
whether the materials it covers are indeed commodifiable, rivalrous, and
subject to zero-sum transactions (p.255). He gives the hypothetical
example of a copyrighted monograph with limited market potential that is
available for download on the publisher’s website for forty dollars and that
is expected to sell about 1,000 copies (p.255). In variation one of the
scenario, a defendant makes an illegal download for personal use. In
variation two, the defendant downloads the book, makes 1,000 digital
copies, and distributes them to libraries and individuals that she thinks
would likely buy the book otherwise. In variation three, the defendants are
1,000 likely buyers who circumvent the paywall on the publisher’s website
and each illegally download a copy of the book for personal use. Green
notes that the material in question is a nonrivalrous public good, and hence
the typical zero-sum nature of tangible property theft is not present, but he
notes that the copyright owner lost, or potentially lost, a thing of value in
each case anyway (p.256). He argues that variation one does not constitute
theft because the owner has suffered only a limited setback to his property
interests but no deprivation of his property (p.256). In variation two, the
defendant possibly deprived the owner not only of the purchase price paid
by the defendant himself but also of that paid by another 1,000 purchasers,
and thus theft has occurred (p.256). In variation three, while the total
financial loss to the owner is the same as in variation two, “no single
offender or group of offenders is sufficiently culpable to justify
criminalization” (pp.256-257).
A similar analysis follows for patent infringement, where Green believes
that losses of a certain level (mainly, the loss of the value of a patent), could
turn an offense into theft (pp.258-259). He acknowledges some of the
special problems related to patent infringement, however, including the
difficulty of criminalizing such infringement in light of the uncertainty
about the validity of an infringed patent, as I have also discussed in my
work on the matter (p.257). 2
When it comes to trademark infringement, Green brings up the existence of
two kinds of victims. First are consumers who mistakenly buy counterfeit
goods, and second are trademark owners who lose sales when potential
customers buy counterfeits or who are deprived of potential licensing fees
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(pp.260-261). Green also references the risk that the use of a trademark on
lower-quality infringing goods will lead to a weakening of the mark and
that, therefore, trademarks are “at least semi-rivalrous in the sense that if
anyone other than the trademark owner uses the mark, it will normally
interfere with the benefits the owner derives from the mark” (p.261).
Should an infringer completely or almost completely deprive a mark of
value, this could result in the use of a label of theft (p.261).
The type of intellectual property that Green deems to be the best fit for theft
law is trade secrets, whose value is often greatly diminished once
confidentiality has been destroyed (p.264). Last, Green believes that virtual
property such as website URLs and the goods in massively multiplayer
online role playing games (MMORPG) could technically qualify for theft
law purposes, even though in the latter case a gaming company could
eliminate a game without owing players indemnification for accumulated
virtual property (pp.265-267).
Concluding Chapter 4, Green cautions that just because something could
qualify as theft, criminalization is not always wise (pp.267-268). Green
also stresses that only misappropriations that involve deprivation of the
owner’s ability to substantially use her property should possibly be labeled
as theft (p.268). Green emphasizes that other legal and non-legal means can
serve to prevent theft, and that some areas such as plagiarism and
MMORPG theft should remain outside the purview of legal regulation from
a policy perspective (p.269).
Green’s parting words acknowledge that this book constitutes a “first cut”,
whose main goal is to encourage other scholars and policymakers to engage
in a more meaningful discussion about theft law (p.270). Green offers some
advice for law reformers wishing to engage in related debates: avoid
overcriminalization; balance concerns of fair labeling with administrability;
define both the actus reus and mens rea elements; define property for
purposes of theft law; grade theft offenses according to three independent
variables: the value of the stolen property, the means by which the theft was
carried out, and the type of stolen property; specify how to allege and prove
theft; and in some cases allow reprosecution for a different form of theft
than that originally charged (pp.271-276).
13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE is a much-needed book in the world of
legal scholarship. Stuart Green provides the most thorough account of the
foundations, logic, and tensions of theft law of which I am aware, thus
giving an unparalleled overview of an important and strangely neglected
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field. As with any book that seeks to offer a readable account of a broad
and complex area, some gaps and questions remain. For example, while
Green offers his thoughts on whether a significant number of hypothetical
scenarios should qualify as theft, several of the dilemmas he presents are
left unanswered. To name just one example of where the lesson to draw
remains a bit elusive, Green discusses how the case for labeling the
unlawful taking of cable television services as theft is more difficult than
that for the taking of electricity (pp.228-229). He then moves on to
discussing Wi-Fi services, however, without giving further guidance as to
whether he would deem any taking of cable television services to be theft
(p.229). Rather, he says a bit later that the case for labeling Wi-Fi
piggybacking as theft is weaker than that for the taking of electricity or
cable, and that one possibility would be to treat such piggybacking as theft
only if it results in degraded service for others (pp.229-230). I would have
enjoyed reading a bit more about his ideas of what this means in the end as
to the optimal criminalization of each of these types of services under theft
law rather than just as to the relative merits of doing so.
Some of the greatest strengths of Green’s book stem from the breadth and
depth of his knowledge of criminal law, which he brings to life through
both historical examples and sometimes amusing yet always enlightening
examples from pop culture. The section on theft in intellectual property
could have been expanded further in my view, in particular because the
book seeks to focus on “Theft Law in the Information Age” as the second
part of its title indicates. One of my questions about the copyright section
was how to determine the total pre-infringement value of a good given that
Green would apparently only allow for a finding of theft if most of the
value has been removed. Even leaving aside some of the other
complexities, the value of a copyrighted good significantly fluctuates over
time and is often more subjective than that of tangible property, and it
appears disconcerting to have such a potentially arbitrary criterion
determine criminalization.
Further, in Green’s example with the three variations on the monograph
download, I remained curious as to how he would feel about some hybrids
of the scenarios he gives (pp.255-256). For example, if someone who
illegally distributes copies to 1,000 potential buyers may be a thief, what
about someone who just tells 1,000 potential buyers how to circumvent the
paywall and access the material themselves? Perhaps more poignantly, I
am not sure why Green exempts individuals who each only downloaded for
themselves from theft liability when he states elsewhere in his book that
exempting de minimis takings from theft law in the context of tangible
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property is unlikely to work because “[b]y creating a license to steal low
value items, it would undermine the norm against theft generally and
potentially raise the aggregate level of . . . theft to intolerable levels”
(p.169). What is the meaningful difference for theft law, to draw a
comparison to variation three of Green’s hypothetical, between 1,000
people each taking one dollar from a man’s wallet that contains no more
money afterwards and the 1,000 likely buyers of the monograph each
illegally downloading the text and hence depriving the owner of its value?
Why are the individuals in the latter scenario insufficiently morally culpable
to subject them to criminal law punishments when those in the former
scenario are not? These tensions pose some important difficulties for
Green’s framework and his requirement of individually caused substantial
deprivation of value for intangible goods in the context of theft law.
In future work, Green may also want to give greater credence to the
possibility that a number of intellectual property goods outside of trade
secrets and virtual property are actually to greater or lesser degrees
rivalrous. For example, Green allows for the possibility that trademark
dilution harms owners. As others 3 and I 4 have argued, however, there is a
chance that dilution could also harm the consumers of the originally
branded goods, leading to a diminished enjoyment of it and potentially also
a lowered resale value. Whether that should enter the calculus when it
comes to the theft label is subject to exploration, but these are some
examples of issues that had to remain untouched due to how condensed the
section on intellectual property is in the book.
Stuart Green has given us much to consider, and I have only touched on
some of the fascinating issues with which we can now wrestle more wisely
and better equipped with knowledge thanks to 13 WAYS TO STEAL A
BICYCLE. Future readers will certainly enjoy the ride.
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Near the end of Dev Gangjee’s wonderful monograph, RELOCATING
THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, and thinking about
its impact, my mind turned to a different issue relating to geography—
that of maps. By the mid-sixteenth century a flourishing trade in maps
and sea charts had developed throughout Europe. Yet cartographers still
struggled at this time with a fundamental problem of representation:
namely, how to project the curved surface of the world on a flat map.
The problem of inaccurate maps and a lack of a uniform approach to
projection was particularly acute for seafarers, many of whom would
describe identical sea journeys in ships’ logs by reference to very
different latitudes, depending on the maps they were using. 1
Cartographers squabbled over which projection of the world was the
most accurate, but without a uniform standard developing. In 1569,
Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator produced a giant map of the
known world titled Nova et Aucta Orbis Terrae Descriptio ad Usum
Navigantium Emendate. Drawing on a grid-based cylindrical projection
developed by Ptolemy in the second century AD, the key advance in
Mercator’s map was his spacing of parallel lines of latitude so that the
gaps between them increased exponentially the further they moved away
from the equator. 2 The effect of this was that any straight lines drawn
between any two ports on the map accurately represented both the
distance between those two ports and a bearing that a navigator could
take to make the journey. In the empty space on his map over North
America, Mercator wrote that his mission was “to represent the
positions and the dimensions of the lands, as well as the distances of
places, as much in conformity with very truth as it is possible so to do”.3
Mercator’s map and projection had an almost immediate impact as a
navigational aid. But it had a far greater significance in shaping how we
see and understand the world. This is something that can still be felt
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today—you only need to go to Google Maps and zoom out as far as
possible to see a modern day example of the Mercator projection.
Gangjee’s monograph is to geographical indications scholarship what
the Mercator projection is to cartography. It solves problems that have
bedevilled scholarship in this field for a century, and imposes order on,
and makes sense of, a field of law that the author rightly describes as
“spectacularly messy” (p.1). The reasons for this mess are well known.
The nature and scope of protection that must be afforded to, and the
institutional forms of protecting, indications of geographical origin
(IGOs) are unsettled throughout the world—something reflected in the
bewildering array of terms and acronyms used to describe various types
of IGO and in the outwardly inexplicable dual levels of protection for
geographical indications (GIs) contained in Articles 22 and 23 of the
TRIPS Agreement. 4 Debates over IGOs, whether undertaken by
government policy-makers or commentators, also tend to be highly
polarized, often shaped by cultural beliefs that a particular model of
protection is the only appropriate means of safeguarding IGOs. Beyond
a limited consensus that IGOs should be protected against use that
misleads consumers as to the origin or qualities of goods, there is no
agreement as to whether more extensive protection (for example, against
dilution or pure misappropriation) is warranted, what legal form such
protection should take, or to what extent it is appropriate to privilege
“localized” production in international trade when to do so imposes
costs on importing countries.
Gangjee’s thesis is that only by stepping back and trying to understand
how signs that indicate the geographical provenance of goods came to
be protected in international intellectual property law from the late
nineteenth century can we evaluate the current legal landscape, in
particular, the GI provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, and think
constructively about the future of GI protection. Taking such an
approach involves setting up new epistemic frameworks to explain why
IGOs have been conceptualized and protected as they have at the
international, regional and domestic levels. It also involves calmly
mediating the often hostile debates that have occurred over the
regulation of IGOs, which only seem to have intensified with the
growing recognition amongst some countries, particularly from the
developing world, of the potential export value of geographically
branded goods. Gangjee has succeeded admirably in achieving his
stated goals. His novel organization of the topic, the new insights he has
been able to provide based on his exemplary, comprehensive research,
and his even-handed, critical engagement with the claims made by both
advocates for and opponents of stronger GI protection, are likely to
change the thinking of many scholars in this field and help to shape
future global debates and policy agendas. As Mercator’s projection did,
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Gangjee’s monograph should become the key, unifying resource in its
field.
Part I of RELOCATING THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL
INDICATIONS consists of a detailed, historical, interdisciplinary
analysis of IGOs, something which has not been undertaken in this sort
of depth or with this sort of intellectual rigor before. Here, Gangjee
unpacks the decisive contribution of three treaties—the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, the Madrid
Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of
Source on Goods of 1891, and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection
of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration of 1958—
as well as a number of domestic IGO protection regimes, in order to
explain the way in which IGOs emerged over the twentieth century as
distinct legal subject matter that took a wide variety of forms. This is
highly original work that sheds light on a largely forgotten body of law.
More fundamentally, it makes a convincing case that understanding the
current international GI framework and making normative arguments as
to the optimal scope of international GI standards can only be done after
first untangling the skein of regulation that developed over the previous
hundred or so years, and fully engaging with the question of “how has
the GI come to mean what it does and function in the way that it does?”
(p.14).
In Chapter 2, in considering the Paris Convention, Gangjee deals with
the overlooked question of why “indications of source”—signs that
merely describe the provenance of goods—were deemed worthy of
protection in an industrial property treaty. He demonstrates, through a
thorough analysis of extrinsic materials, that the “valuable intangible”
sought to be protected was in fact the collective reputation that attached
to regional products. Indications of source were, accordingly, treated as
similar, though ontologically separate from, trade marks, with Union
members required to provide broadly similar rights against the use of
“false” indications under Article 10 and misrepresentation by way of
Article 10bis. In this way, Gangjee identifies an early model of IGO
protection that recognized the collective nature of the subject matter,
with the scope of protection based on a purely communicative logic—
that is, that the indication provided useful information to consumers
about the origin of goods produced by one of a number of local traders
entitled to use the indication. At the same time, Gangjee uncovers a
strong degree of opposition amongst founding members of the Paris
Union, notably France, to a minimum standard of protection based on
consumers having been misled. The concern here was that such a
standard was inadequate to protect indications in export markets, where
the indication might not be understood as having geographical
significance. Gangjee suggests that a desire for more absolute
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protection explains the quickly assembled Madrid Agreement of 1891,
the effect of Articles 1(1) and 4 of which is to oblige members to ensure
the seizure on importation of wine bearing false indications of source,
even if those indications are generic in the country of importation. Here,
Gangjee identifies the emergence of a different logic underpinning IGO
protection—that certain indications might represent not only origin, but
also a unique link between product and place, such that they ought never
to be able to be used as generic product descriptors, irrespective of what
consumers in a particular country might understand the term to mean.
That is, we start to see the emergence of a terroir logic underpinning
IGO regulation, albeit at this stage only in relation to geographical terms
used to identify one type of product, namely, wine.
It is at this point that what might appear to be an unusual decision in
terms of the structure of the monograph makes perfect sense. Having
identified two different and competing logics underpinning international
IGO protection (the communicative and terroir logics), Gangjee turns
away from the multilateral regime to explore these logics as manifested
in a number of national models of IGO protection. This is done to show
that any attempt to understand how the notion of “the GI” that emerged
in international intellectual property law at the end of the twentieth
century cannot be undertaken by reference to international conventions
alone. Rather, it requires an appreciation of the seemingly irreconcilable
interests of those advocating for particular standards and forms of IGO
protection, which can only be achieved by an examination of their
national laws and their rural policies. Gangjee’s approach also allows
for a wider critique of the two logics based on their historical origins
and development, which is important given his stated desire to reframe
the global debate about the justifications for protecting GIs at particular
levels.
The primary focus of Chapter 3 is therefore on the development of the
terroir-influenced French Appellations d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC)
system. In a superb analysis at the start of the chapter, Gangjee unpacks
the obscure notion of terroir. He argues that it can be conceived of as a
“mythical” or spiritual bond between place and product that has been
used for the purposes of regional identity formation, a “deterministic
influence” that prioritizes the uniqueness of physical and environmental
elements in the production of goods, or “a more contingent composite of
natural and human factors, open to innovation” (p.85). He then
demonstrates how the French system of IGO protection was informed by
this second, deterministic notion of terroir, with a gradual recognition of
the third, composite notion. More specifically, in a painstakingly
researched and engagingly written part of the chapter, he shows how in
the late nineteenth century the French state, prompted by significant
vine shortages which led to fraudulent origin labelling of wine, sought to
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intervene in the market for wine by managing production levels in wineproducing regions. Through various decrees, it first sought to define the
boundaries of such regions and, following the adoption of the AOC
regime from the 1930s, to administer the registration of the names of
such regions and to prescribe the qualities, characteristics and methods
of production of wines from such regions whose producers were entitled
to use registered names. On the basis that registered names were
thought to indicate unique qualities and characteristics of wine, these
laws gave entitled producers the right to prevent non-entitled traders
from using the registered name outright (that is, even for the purposes of
comparison). The value of Gangjee’s historical approach is that it
shows how contingent the strong French sui generis model of protection
was on a range of purely domestic factors that helped shape its rural
policy. His analysis also raises real questions about the “transferability”
of such a model to the international stage, something he takes up in later
chapters. At the same time, Gangjee charts a subtle shift in the French
AOC model in the increasing importance it placed on human factors,
such as stable customs or localized knowledge, in the production of
regional goods. In doing so, his approach avoids falling into the trap of
caricaturing terroir as a fabricated idea of uniqueness based on static
conceptions of place, and instead recognizes the potential significance of
human know-how and its intersection with geographical factors as
explaining why IGOs might serve more than a communicative function,
which might then impact on the scope of protection afforded to them.
This characterisation becomes especially important as Gangjee returns
to the international arena in Chapter 4, which focuses primarily on the
Lisbon Agreement of 1958, an agreement underpinned by terroir logic
that sets up a multilateral registration and protection scheme for
appellations of origin for all products. Gangjee makes a strong case
that, despite its low membership, this treaty is worth examining because
it shows not only how the French notion of the appellation of origin
came to be received in international discourse, but also some of the
significant difficulties involved in structuring an international agreement
around the category. He traces particular problems with the Lisbon
definition of “appellation of origin” (such as whether it contains an
implicit requirement that the qualities or characteristics of the named
product be unique to its place of origin, or whether human factors alone
would be sufficient to justify protection), and with the registration
scheme designed to “settle . . . matters of definitional validity and
protected status in the home country, then export this status to the entire
Lisbon Membership” (p.157).
It is at this point that the monograph takes another unexpected, but
entirely justifiable, turn. Rather than offering a descriptive account of
the operation of Article 3 of Lisbon, which requires Members to protect
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registered appellations “against any usurpation or imitation, even if the
true origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in
translated form or accompanied by terms such as ‘kind,’ ‘type,’ ‘make,’
‘imitation,’ or the like”, Gangjee engages with the normative arguments
that could be marshalled to justify protecting IGOs at particular levels.
In doing so, he makes the original claim that Lisbon is not aimed at
preventing “dilution” or even “misappropriation” of geographical
names, but rather that it obliges “absolute” protection, based on a
contractual model where each Member has recognized the mutual
advantage in providing unqualified protection to others’ appellations.
This is the most convincing explanation of Lisbon put forward to date,
particularly given the small number of countries responsible for its
negotiation. It also helps explain why such a model is unlikely to be
accepted by WTO Members more generally, except in the context of
bilateral arrangements between Members that are negotiated on a similar
“contractual” basis.
Having set up the competing epistemic frameworks and charted the
tortuous history of IGO protection domestically and internationally,
Gangjee turns in Part II to the GI provisions in the TRIPS Agreement.
Here, he builds on his thesis by arguing that TRIPS, being “burdened
with unstable compromises” based on competing communicative and
terroir logics, cannot provide a coherent blueprint for international
protection. Despite this, he suggests that it is the very “indeterminacy of
its provisions [that] makes possible the reconceptualisation of GI
protection within the existing framework” (p.184). To this end, Chapter
5 explores the origins, operation, and indeterminacy of TRIPS, while
Chapter 6 looks to the flexibilities within TRIPS for accommodating “an
alternative or supplementary epistemology of GIs” (p.266).
Chapter 5 covers territory that is likely to be familiar to scholars of GIs,
but it does so in a fresh way, affording new insights throughout. For
example, most treatments of GIs in TRIPS start by focusing on the
disagreement in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations over whether,
and to what extent, IGOs ought to be protected in a treaty intended to
have broad membership. Gangjee goes further back, discussing the
attempts at WIPO from the mid-1970s to construct the “geographical
indication” as subject matter occupying a different conceptual space
from both the Paris-based indication of source and the Lisbon-based
appellation of origin, and showing how this approach provided the
foundations for the TRIPS GI definition. He then challenges the idea
that TRIPS represents a major advance in this area of the law, arguing
that what was agreed in TRIPS was a heavily negotiated compromise
between the EU and the US, based on their fundamentally different
understandings of the message and guarantee associated with geographic
terms and the appropriate legal mechanisms for protecting them against
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misuse, underpinned by competing communicative and terroir logics.
In one remarkable passage (pp.224-229), he shows that the position is
even more convoluted than this. He demonstrates that the reason that
the TRIPS definition of a GI requires only that the reputation of the
good (rather than its quality or a specific characteristic) be essentially
attributable to its geographical origin for the indication to be protected
was not the result of a desire to accommodate the certification mark
models of protection in countries such as the US and Australia. Rather,
it was the product of competing understandings within the EU over what
sort of geographic terms should be protected (something reflected in the
EU’s internal, dual model of protection, which itself fuses
communicative and terroir logics).
Exploring these themes of
compromise and instability further, Gangjee then addresses the lack of a
normative basis for the differing levels of protection contained in
Articles 22.2 (the Paris-based misrepresentation standard, applying to
GIs for all products) and 23.1 (the Lisbon-based absolute standard, but
applying to GIs for wine and spirits only). He also offers a lucid
account of some of the limitations of the exceptions contained in Article
24, notably those dealing with generic terms and with the relationship
between GIs and trade marks. Although this is not by any means its
primary purpose, Chapter 5 could serve as an excellent stand-alone
primer for those seeking a detailed, nuanced understanding of the TRIPS
GI provisions. More than this, the chapter succeeds as critical analysis,
in that it upends the teleological reading of TRIPS that has taken hold in
some scholarship (that is, that TRIPS should be seen as a useful
“consolidating project” (p.262) that has set up clear, stable, global rules
for protecting IGOs).
It might have been expected that the monograph would conclude with an
analysis of the ongoing GI debates in TRIPS—over whether the absolute
protection contained in Article 23.1 should be extended to apply to GIs
for all products, and over the nature of the multilateral notification and
registration scheme required to be set up under Article 23.4. Chapter 6
does deal with these issues, but Gangjee’s main interest in this
penultimate chapter lies elsewhere. His concern here is to ask whether
there are different logics and other justifications for protecting GIs,
particularly those that might support something more than
misrepresentation-based protection. His central argument is that if the
object of legal protection is recognized to be not just the geographic sign
but also the product itself, this might greatly expand the range of
potential justifications for legal protection.
Thus, drawing on
agricultural economics, he considers arguments for protecting such
products based on biodiversity conservation and on rural development
(that is, the improvement of rural incomes and the sustenance of rural
populations by privileging regionally produced goods in international
trade). Gangjee concludes by considering that the most promising
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rationale, particularly given the growing interest in GIs amongst
developing countries, relates to the protection of traditional knowledge.
Specifically, he suggests that “‘absolute’ protection could potentially be
explained on the basis that it recognizes a certain form of TK—the
savoir faire or local knowledge identified in Chapter 3 and potentially
incorporated within the TRIPS definition in Chapter 5” (p.287). His
concluding argument here, building on his historical work in Part I, is
that reserving the use of certain names to the “original” producer group
both recognizes the collectively generated and intergenerationally
transmitted knowledge that has gone into the production of the goods
and allows space for such knowledge to continue to evolve.
This is a rich, densely packed book, and a major contribution to the
scholarship in the discipline. But, like the Mercator projection, it does
have some limitations, particularly in the way in prioritizes some issues
(and countries) over others. For example, while Chapter 3 does an
excellent job of deconstructing terroir and explaining the emergence of
the French sui generis model of protection, the treatment of other
countries’ models of protection in this chapter is underdeveloped.
Although the communicative logic of IGO protection as reflected in
German and British law is more easily explained, it would have been
useful to have considered the rural and trade policies of Germany and
the UK in this chapter. In addition, it would also have been useful to
have addressed the experiences of other key agricultural exporters
(many with large immigrant communities) at this point, in exploring
why it was that the conditions for AOC-style protection did not emerge
throughout the world. This would also have given more context in
Chapter 4 as to why the Lisbon Agreement is generally viewed as being
of such marginal importance and why recent calls for Lisbon’s
“misunderstood potential” to be recognized by WTO Members 5 have
perhaps received such a muted response. Further, while Gangjee draws
an insightful connection in Chapter 3 between early French boundary
determinations and the current Australian and US wine GI registration
schemes, this analysis tends to gloss over the context of the latter
countries’ adoptions of GI-specific laws and the influence of bilateral
arrangements in this regard. 6 While Gangjee touches on the role of GIs
in bilateral and preferential trade agreements at various places in the
book, more might have been made on the relationship between these and
the multilateral sphere. This is because such agreements bring into
focus how much GIs have been used by particular countries as
instruments of pure trade policy, where one trading partner is asked to
afford higher or absolute levels of GI protection in exchange for other,
non-GI related, trade benefits. With a growing number of preferential
trade agreements making specific provision for GIs in this manner, this
calls into question the importance of debates at the multilateral level
over appropriate standards of protection. At the very least it suggests
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that despite the growing number of WTO Members arguing in favor of
GI extension, any renegotiation of the international standards is unlikely
to take place on the basis of principled arguments, but rather only if
appropriate trade concessions (potentially extending well beyond
intellectual property issues) are granted. 7
A related concern is with Gangjee’s discussion of alternative
justifications for protection in Chapter 6. While this thought-provoking
chapter contains some of the most sophisticated interdisciplinary
research in the monograph, the arguments here are perhaps not quite as
sharp, and the conclusions not as fully realized, as in many other places
in the book. Recognizing that GI protection might be justified on
various non-trademark related grounds does not, of itself, provide
normative arguments in favor of increasing international levels of
protection beyond the misrepresentation standard. A separate case
needs to be made that the rationale for protecting regionally produced
goods in one country justifies mandatory international standards that
oblige importing countries to privilege such goods in their domestic
markets, notwithstanding the market distortions that might be involved.
One can both support, for example, the EU’s internal attempts to sustain
its rural economy through strong GI protection and query the costs that
exporting EU levels of protection would impose on other countries in
which European goods are sold. Further, the idea that the preservation
of traditional knowledge can provide a normative argument that
supports absolute levels of GI protection raises difficult questions about
the precise role that legal standards play in ensuring that developing
country producers can secure access to foreign markets, and whether
other issues such as ensuring adequate investment in local production,
quality control, proper marketing, and fair distribution of returns form
the sale of geographically branded goods are in fact key here. 8 The
problem with the attempt to draw a link between justifications and levels
of protection is encapsulated by a quote at the end of the chapter, where
Gangjee suggests that “[i]f the products—and those who produce
them—are sufficiently valued or important, then the associated sign
ought to be reserved for the home producer group, regardless of the
sign’s reception before a given audience” (p.296, my emphasis). Yet this
begs the question of exactly how this “sufficiency” is to be worked out
in the international sphere: at what point does the desire to safeguard, or
the value of, the human know-how of a community take precedence
over the communicative function of the sign in a different country? (Or
is this something that can realistically only be determined on a bilateral
basis?) These are extremely difficult normative questions and, in
fairness, Gangjee recognizes that the ideas he raises in the latter part of
Chapter 6 are at an embryonic stage, and are best seen as a call for
future research. 9
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Notwithstanding these minor concerns, RELOCATING THE LAW OF
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS remains an outstanding monograph.
It is beautifully and engagingly written, impeccably researched and,
above all, compellingly argued throughout. It imposes much needed
clarity and order over the law of GIs, but not at the expense of
complexity, nuance or analytical rigor. It is the most authoritative text
that has been written on the topic, and will be an invaluable aid to
navigators of this body of the law for years to come.
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Julie Cohen has made extraordinarily illuminating contributions to the field
of law and technology. In CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF,
she articulates a compelling normative framework for her earlier
interventions. Her method is eclectic, situated, and particularist. She
adopts no sweeping philosophical desiderata to unify her treatment of
intellectual property online. Nor do economic measures of efficiency and
utility motivate the project.
Cohen’s CONFIGURING is instead a book that takes online subjectivity
and community seriously, in both its established and emergent forms. It
cautions against either public or private entities trying too hard to monitor
and control information flows online. It does so not in the name of fairness,
welfare, utility, or deontology, but in the name of play—or, more
expansively, recognizing the value of intrinsically worthwhile, “pursuedfor-their-own sake” activities on the net. Grounded in cultural theory and
thick descriptions of life online, Cohen’s work should lead thinkers within
law—and well outside it—to reconsider how they think about critical
problems in the design and regulation of technology.
To demonstrate this, I’m going to focus less on how CONFIGURING
should affect others’ thought, and more on how it changed how I think
about digital copyright infringement. In past work, I’ve endorsed legal
reform that is broadly in the mainstream of technocratic meliorism, 1
including a proposal to tax broadband to compensate artists based on their
popularity.
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Those who take CONFIGURING seriously can’t endorse such a proposal
without more adequately acknowledging its “costs.” Moreover, Cohen
shows us why the term “costs” deserves scare quotes. Influenced by her, I
use it here only in the broadest sense of “negative effects,” and not to claim
the patina of quantified rationality enjoyed by cost-benefit analysis.
My review focuses first on the practical implications of CONFIGURING,
then addresses Cohen’s methodology. A cautionary note: CONFIGURING
is an extraordinarily rich, dense book. Rather than merely applying extant
cultural theory to law, Cohen tends to distill it into her own distinctive
social theory of the information age. Thus, even relatively short sections of
chapters of her book often merit article-length close readings, optimally
done by a reader far better schooled in social theory than me. What I can
offer here is a brief for the practical importance of Cohen’s theory, and
ways it should influence Internet policy and scholarship.
As Cohen shows in her discussion of “the emergence of architectures of
control,” both government and corporate efforts to manage computers and
the Internet have a long history. The 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
criminalized “unauthorized access” to “protected” computer systems. In the
1990s, a series of changes in copyright law parried the impact of new
technologies of reproduction and distribution of works. Worries over
cybersecurity, industrial espionage, and pornography also shaped legislative
battles and law enforcement decisions.
By the late 1990s, the Internet appeared to be at a crossroads, drifting either
toward either “info-anarchy” or “perfect control.” Just as the major record
labels seemed to have secured an impregnable oligopoly, services like
Napster disrupted their (and many other content owners’) control over
works. “File sharing” provoked new technology and law designed to
control users’ activity. Cohen wrote a series of articles at the time
critiquing misguided initiatives and proposing technology and law that
would give users some assurance that rights they traditionally enjoyed in the
analog world would endure as more works went digital. 2
Then, as now, there has been a divide between an academic community
deeply committed to promoting user rights, and the content managers who
aspire to monetize works. Some academics proposed a middle ground,
designed to separate the issue of control from compensation. In the past,
when Congress realized that new technology would lead to widespread
copying, it often imposed a small fee per copy—a practice known as
compulsory licensing. This regime, still in place for many works, could
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perhaps be applied to digital copying, assuring some payment to artists and
distributors without trampling free speech and a thriving remix culture. 3
The recording industry itself has repeatedly (and successfully) lobbied to
force composers and lyricists to accept a governmentally set compulsory
license; turnabout is fair play.
Some say that the compulsory licensing regime can’t work in the Wild West
of untrammeled Internet distribution. But Terry Fisher has offered a
detailed proposal in PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT. 4 The Fisher plan would subsidize
culture by lightly taxing the communication networks that enable its
uncompensated duplication, and distributing the proceeds to artists based on
how often their works are accessed and viewed.
I have endorsed proposals like Fisher’s in the past. And yet, looking at
them from the perspective of Cohen’s “networked self,” I grow more
skeptical. To work well, the new compulsory licensing must rely on
pervasive surveillance of what is being listened to and watched. If purely
based on “number of downloads” or “number of views”, it would provoke
extensive gaming. We’ve already seen scandals concerning artists who
allegedly manipulated their YouTube view count (either to gain more ad
revenue, or to appear more popular than they actually were). Such gaming
will in turn provoke countermeasures—monitoring who is viewing and
liking what. Do we really want some central authority to collect all this
information, merely in order to ensure that Lady Gaga gets, say, 100 times
more revenue than Lana del Ray? 5
After reading Cohen’s work, it’s hard not to see technocratic plans for
allocating entertainment industry revenue as an instance of “modulation,”
an effort to monitor and exercise soft control over certain communities
(here, artists). We should reconsider the plasticity of institutions like
compulsory license fees. Maybe there should be minimum compensation,
to assure some degree of security to all artists (WPA 2.0?), and maximum
gains, to discourage gaming at the high end? Perhaps the aspiration to
precisely calibrate reward to “value,” as measured by the number of times
something is viewed or watched, fails on its own economic terms: a
particularly effective film may do its “work” in one sitting. 6 Or someone
might reasonably value one experience of a particularly transcendent song
over 100 plays of background music.
The larger point here is that there is not just a tension between the play of
creativity and the copyright maximalism of dominant industry players.

The IP Law Book Review

34

Even the most progressive reform proposals can unintentionally warp
creative endeavors in one way or another. The legal establishment has more
often than not tried to wall out these considerations: “we’ll worry about the
law and the money, and let the artists themselves figure out the creative
angle.” But, as Cohen shows, the experience of play and creativity are at
the core of the enterprise—they shouldn’t be treated as “add-ons” or
independent of legal deliberations. We can’t get cultural policy right if we
fail to consider what better and worse modes of artistic creation are on the
terms of creators themselves.
What if it turns out that properly calibrating risk and reward is a nearimpossible task for law? I’m reminded of the insights of John Kay’s
OBLIQUITY: WHY OUR GOALS ARE BEST ACHIEVED
INDIRECTLY, 7 and in that spirit, let me make a side observation on the
way to my point. At least in my experience, the best way of predicting
whether someone would pursue a career in the arts was a wealthy spouse or
family. The word is out: it’s simply too risky to try and make a living as a
painter, musician, actor, or poet—particularly given constant pressure for
cuts to welfare benefits, food stamps, and Medicaid in the United States.
But in other countries, where the social safety net is more generous, the
possibility of failure is not so bone-chilling. Consider the fate of J.K.
Rowling, who hit “rock bottom” (in her words) while writing, and had to
rely on Britain’s benefits system. 8 A few years of support allowed her to
get a foothold in the literary profession—and without it, Harry Potter might
never have been written. The implementation of the Affordable Care Act in
2014 is one bright spot for the marginally employed in the United States.
Perhaps we’ll find, decades hence, that the biggest impetus to artistic
careers (and independent employment of all kind) was guaranteed issue of
health insurance policies via state exchanges, and subsidies to purchase
them. Perhaps the health policy experts will do more to advance creativity
than all the copyright policymakers combined, simply by assuring some
breathing room for the (hopefully, temporary) failures of those in creative
industries.
These reflections may not gather much of a following in an academy that
prizes methodological rigor and citation counts over whimsy and the
acknowledgement of contingency. But the academy’s own disciplines and
forms of problem definition can obscure as much as they clarify. 9 Their
appeal can be more rhetorical than substantive. As Cohen has stated:
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[T]he purported advantage of rights theories and economic
theories is neither precisely that they are normative nor
precisely that they are scientific, but that they do normative
work in a scientific way. Their normative heft derives from a
small number of formal principles and purports to concern
questions that are a step or two removed from the particular
question of policy to be decided . . . . These theories manifest
a quasi-scientific neutrality as to copyright law that consists
precisely in the high degree of abstraction with which they
facilitate thinking about processes of cultural transmission.10
Cohen notes many “scholars’ aversion to the complexities of cultural
theory, which persistently violates those principles.” 11 But she feels they
should embrace it, given that it offers “account[s] of the nature and
development of knowledge that [are] both far more robust and far more
nuanced than anything that liberal political philosophy has to offer . . . .
[particularly in understanding] how existing knowledge systems have
evolved, and how they are encoded and enforced.” 12
A term like “knowledge system” may itself seem very abstract, and far from
the urgency of contemporary debates about privacy or intellectual property.
But its very open-endedness and capaciousness is precisely what is needed
as technology advances and leaves us in an increasingly “weightless”
economy and society. As more economic value is located in software
systems, “big data”, pattern recognition, and the “lords of the cloud” with
privileged access to all these processes, we ought to feel more free to
reimagine the terms of social cooperation—not less. These systems are in
principle more plastic than the industrial economy they are supplanting—
but may well end up being less easy to influence to reflect public values. 13
Notably, Cohen evokes imagination in two of her chapter titles—
“Imagining the Networked Information Society” and “Reimagining
Privacy.” 14 The value of her emphasis on particularism—and the cultural
theory such close reading of actual practice supports—lies precisely in its
ability to catalyze creative thought about social arrangements, fueled by
attention to actually existing cultures and creativity and discretion. Like the
“constructed commons” project of Madison, Strandburg, & Frischmann,
Cohen’s work points to experiments in information sharing (and protecting)
that need to be preserved against standardization according to monolithic
economic or philosophical models.
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Inspired by Cohen’s work, we may well be able to get beyond the usual
antinomy of information as “end product” (which justifies a high purchase
price) vs. “input” (which is used as a justification for policies that set a zero
or low price on content, like fair use or compulsory licensing). Cohen’s
work insists on a capacious view of network-enabled forms of knowing.
Rather than naturalizing and accepting as given the limits of copyright law
on the dissemination of knowledge, she can subsume them into a much
broader framework of understanding where “knowing” is going. That
framework includes cultural practices, norms, economics, and bureaucratic
processes, as well as law.
We’ve seen that kind of ambition before, in Lawrence Lessig’s CODE:
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE. 15 But Cohen is not willing to
accept its pathbreaking “modalities” approach to the shaping and control of
human action. 16 As stated in Chapter 7 of CONFIGURING:
The four-part framework [of Lessig’s CODE] cannot take us
where we need to go. An account of regulation emerging
from the Newtonian interaction of code, law, market, and
norms [i.e., culture] is far too simple regarding both
instrumentalities and effects. The architectures of control
now coalescing around issues of copyright and security
signal systemic realignments in the ordering of vast sectors
of activity both inside and outside markets, in response to
asserted needs that are both economic and societal. 17
What is happening beyond the CODE framework? Aside from the
theoretical rationales Cohen givens, historical developments motivate a
move beyond Lessig’s pre-millennial framework.
The Internet is in many ways centralizing power. 18 But life online runs the
gamut from frivolity to high public purpose. 19 As Ethan Zukerman
observes, these high and low aims can be mutually reinforcing. 20 A video
like “Collateral Murder” can be spliced into MIA’s “Vicki Leekz”
mixtape. 21 A Twitter community formed around cricket may turn to
political activism, and vice versa. 22 As images, music, and words get
recopied, repurposed, and remixed, symbolic orders emerge undisciplined
by the usual triple authority of church, state, and home.
As legal scholars, we’re conditioned to jump to the normative questions
immediately, asking “is this a good thing?” It’s tempting to flee to free
speech-fundamentalism (“promiscuous publication and zero privacy, uber
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alles!”) or control fetishism (“lock down and propertize!”) in order to
respond decisively to fast-paced events. 23 Cohen insists that before we take
any normative stance toward the blooming, buzzing confusion of Internet
life, we had better understand it. Cultural theory is above all specific—to
time, place, and people grappling with situated struggles.
Reading Cohen’s book, I was reminded of classic debates about the role of
social science, philosophy, and values in law. As David Kennedy and
William W. Fisher III have observed,
Law students struggle to understand the relationship between
“the rules” and the vague arguments that lawyers call
“policy.” Should “policy” begin only in the exception—
when legal deduction runs out—or should it be a routine part
of legal analysis? If the latter, how should lawyers reason
about policy? What should go into reasoning about
“policy”—how much ethics, how much empiricism, how
much economics? Which of the arguments laypeople use
count as professionally acceptable arguments of “policy” and
which do not? Which mark one as naïve, an outsider to the
professional consensus? What is it about policy argument
that makes it seem more professional, more analytical, more
persuasive, than talking about “mere politics”? 24
Cohen cleared the ground for CONFIGURING in earlier works like
Lochner in Cyberspace and Copyright and the Perfect Curve. 25 In those
articles, she explored how ostensibly neutral and objective philosophic and
economic approaches failed to rise above “mere politics” in many contexts.
Combining her analytic critique with the narrative of legislative history in
Jessica Litman’s DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, 26 one is hard-pressed to interpret
modern copyright policy as much more than a messy compromise between
the commercial interests of massive communications, content, and Internet
firms. That law has created a set of baseline expectations that is hard to
rationalize on either economic or philosophic grounds. Moreover, efforts to
justify small departures from it on such grounds miss a greater and more
necessary subject of critique and reconsideration: namely, the larger
information system that intellectual property and surveillance laws are
underwriting.
As more traditional scholars battle over whether Comcast’s property and
free speech rights should trump those of their customers, 27 Cohen suggests a
more open-ended approach. How invasive is the deep packet inspection
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that an Internet Service Provider like Comcast proposes? Who gets to
monitor its monitoring? Why is it performing this surveillance? Are
financial criminals as likely to be targeted as, say, copyright infringers? 28
Who gets the data? What type of activity will be chilled by this
intervention? Can users opt out, or is the fused public and private power
here for all intents and purposes monopolistic? As she notes, “[s]ome
information policy problems cannot be solved simply by prescribing greater
‘openness’ or more ‘neutrality:’”
[R]ights of access to information and information networks
do not necessarily correlate with rights to privacy; indeed,
they more typically function in the opposite way. As network
users become habituated to trading information for
information and other services, access to goods and services
takes place in an environment characterized by increasing
amounts of both transparency and exposure . . . . [H]uman
flourishing in the networked information society requires
additional structural safeguards.
....
. . . . The lives of situated subjects are increasingly shaped
by decisions made and implemented using networked
information technologies. Those decisions present some
possibilities and foreclose others. Most people have very
little understanding of the ways that such decisions are made
or of the options that are not presented. In many cases, this
facial inaccessibility is reinforced by regimes of secrecy that
limit even technically trained outsiders to “black box”
testing. We would not tolerate comparable restrictions on
access to the basic laws of physics, chemistry, or biology,
which govern the operation of the physical environment.
The algorithms and protocols that sort and categorize
situated subjects, shape information flows, and authorize or
deny access to network resources are the basic operational
laws of the emerging networked information society; to
exercise meaningful control over their surroundings, people
need access to a baseline level of information about what
those algorithms and protocols do. 29
Trying to theorize rights and utility claims in the absence of such
information may be an exercise in futility. We can’t grasp the landscape
without a map.
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A short review can only scratch the surface of Cohen’s contributions in this
book. So far, I’ve barely mentioned the type of selfhood her work aims to
support. CONFIGURING’s construction of the “networked self” is deeply
insightful, and deserves at least some comment.
There is a lucky class of people who live to work, but most tend to work in
order to live. 30 The point of life is in non-work—time to spend with family
and friends, enjoy culture (low, high, and in between), to reconnect with the
ultimate sources of value and meaning, and to communicate about all of
this. This balance of work and leisure, or instrumentally rational action and
value-driven action, is a theme of political economy. In a field preoccupied
with the fair allocation of rewards from work(s) of various kinds, Cohen
emphasizes the “play” of culture, subjectivity, and material practice in
respective parts of her book. 31 She helps us understand that “play” isn’t just
something that happens on the edges of a life well lived—it’s often the
point.
Cohen’s work on play fills in a concept simultaneously hypostatized by
natural law theory (Finnis calls play one of the seven basic human goods),
and too often left under-explained within it. As Cohen shows, play is
indeed capacious, ranging from remixes of music videos and punning on
Twitter to the “freedom to tinker” with devices and undisturbed exploration
of alternate points of view (or even alternate selves). Considering some of
the edgier forms of play, we may well understand why the natural law
theorists have left it relatively underdeveloped (in comparison with other
basic goods like sociability, religion, life, and aesthetic experience).
Moreover, one person’s play can be another’s boring chore (I remember
how enthusiastic I was as a kid to play Monopoly, and how my poor
overworked father recoiled, in mock horror, from another round of
“Monotony”). Play can be paradoxical, creating (within its general aura of
rest and Csikmenthalyian flow) spaces of reward and frustration,
achievement and stigma. But those alternate spaces are (supposed to be a)
refuge from the daily grind of getting and spending, control and submission,
that are characteristic of our more hierarchically ordered economy and
politics.
Space for play and leisure has been politically contested. Patterns of rest
and work considered perfectly acceptable under feudalism had to be altered
dramatically by capitalist enterprise. Workers fought back over decades,
demanding limits on the workweek and certain basic rights. And that
revolution has in turn inspired a counterrevolution in our time, promoted by
both neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. 32 Under neoliberalism, the
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sphere of play must either contract or bear profit. Under post-9/11
neoconservativism, there is an increasing emphasis on surveillance of all
aspects of life, leaving little room for the unsupervised, unmonitored
encounters vital to certain forms of intersubjectivity and self-expression. 33
Leading neoliberals and neoconservatives employ the rhetoric of emergency
to announce “there is no alternative” to the social arrangements that their
theories, in truth, merely recommend. 34 Our social networks do not need to
be fonts of advertising revenue; our artists should not need to shake down
every would-be fan. At least in the developed world, there is ample social
surplus to support these are far more creative endeavors. 35 Nor does the
“terrorist threat” merit the level of surveillance or policing now targeted at
political activists, copyright infringers, and travelers. The economic
pressure of austerity and the political movement for absolute “security” are
in this sense “play emergencies” in the pejorative sense of play: performed,
pretended, miniature. 36 The men behind the curtains of banks and law
enforcement agencies ominously warn of horrible consequences should they
not get their way. In response, we must question: when is the cure of
control worse than the diseases of disorder it promises to eliminate? When
is “disorder” really an unrecognized, spontaneous order, worth preserving
rather than taming and transforming?
Cohen’s book will not give us definitive answers to these questions. But in
forcing us to consider them, it substantially broadens the horizon of inquiry
in what are classically considered “intellectual property and privacy”
disputes. While narrow specialists in each field tend to develop tunnel
vision, the lived experience of Internet users inevitably discloses their
intertwining (with every EULA clicked, or ad served, or warning given
about the consequences of infringement and industry and government’s
ability to watch it). 37 Powerful trends would ever more tightly restrict
individual access to content, and ever expand the ability of various
authorities to monitor that access. Cohen’s work forces us to reconsider
those social forces in light a true “play emergency”—the declining number
of free, unmonitored, unmonetized opportunities ordinary people have to
pursue creative expression, cooperation, and consumption. Preserving and
expanding those spaces is as worthy a vocation as promoting economic
efficiency or defending rights.
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